mirror of https://github.com/zulip/zulip.git
171 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
171 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
from functools import wraps
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from typing import Any, Callable, Dict
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from django.utils.module_loading import import_string
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from django.utils.cache import add_never_cache_headers
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from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt, csrf_protect
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from zerver.decorator import authenticated_json_view, authenticated_rest_api_view, \
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process_as_post, authenticated_uploads_api_view, RespondAsynchronously, \
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ReturnT
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from zerver.lib.response import json_method_not_allowed, json_unauthorized
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from django.http import HttpRequest, HttpResponse, HttpResponseRedirect
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from django.conf import settings
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METHODS = ('GET', 'HEAD', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH')
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FLAGS = ('override_api_url_scheme')
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def default_never_cache_responses(
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view_func: Callable[..., HttpResponse]) -> Callable[..., HttpResponse]:
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"""Patched version of the standard Django never_cache_responses
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decorator that adds headers to a response so that it will never be
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cached, unless the view code has already set a Cache-Control
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header.
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We also need to patch this because our Django+Tornado
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RespondAsynchronously hack involves returning a value that isn't a
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Django response object, on which add_never_cache_headers would
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crash. This only occurs in a case where client-side caching
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wouldn't be possible anyway (we aren't returning a response to the
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client yet -- it's for longpolling).
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"""
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@wraps(view_func)
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def _wrapped_view_func(request: HttpRequest, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> ReturnT:
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response = view_func(request, *args, **kwargs)
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if response is RespondAsynchronously or response.has_header("Cache-Control"):
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return response
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add_never_cache_headers(response)
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return response
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return _wrapped_view_func
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@default_never_cache_responses
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@csrf_exempt
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def rest_dispatch(request: HttpRequest, **kwargs: Any) -> HttpResponse:
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"""Dispatch to a REST API endpoint.
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Unauthenticated endpoints should not use this, as authentication is verified
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in the following ways:
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* for paths beginning with /api, HTTP Basic auth
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* for paths beginning with /json (used by the web client), the session token
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This calls the function named in kwargs[request.method], if that request
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method is supported, and after wrapping that function to:
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* protect against CSRF (if the user is already authenticated through
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a Django session)
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* authenticate via an API key (otherwise)
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* coerce PUT/PATCH/DELETE into having POST-like semantics for
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retrieving variables
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Any keyword args that are *not* HTTP methods are passed through to the
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target function.
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Never make a urls.py pattern put user input into a variable called GET, POST,
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etc, as that is where we route HTTP verbs to target functions.
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"""
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supported_methods = {} # type: Dict[str, Any]
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# duplicate kwargs so we can mutate the original as we go
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for arg in list(kwargs):
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if arg in METHODS:
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supported_methods[arg] = kwargs[arg]
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del kwargs[arg]
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if 'GET' in supported_methods:
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supported_methods.setdefault('HEAD', supported_methods['GET'])
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if request.method == 'OPTIONS':
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response = HttpResponse(status=204) # No content
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response['Allow'] = ', '.join(sorted(supported_methods.keys()))
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return response
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# Override requested method if magic method=??? parameter exists
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method_to_use = request.method
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if request.POST and 'method' in request.POST:
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method_to_use = request.POST['method']
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if method_to_use in supported_methods:
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entry = supported_methods[method_to_use]
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if isinstance(entry, tuple):
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target_function, view_flags = entry
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target_function = import_string(target_function)
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else:
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target_function = import_string(supported_methods[method_to_use])
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view_flags = set()
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# Set request._query for update_activity_user(), which is called
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# by some of the later wrappers.
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request._query = target_function.__name__
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# We want to support authentication by both cookies (web client)
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# and API keys (API clients). In the former case, we want to
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# do a check to ensure that CSRF etc is honored, but in the latter
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# we can skip all of that.
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#
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# Security implications of this portion of the code are minimal,
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# as we should worst-case fail closed if we miscategorise a request.
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# for some special views (e.g. serving a file that has been
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# uploaded), we support using the same url for web and API clients.
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if ('override_api_url_scheme' in view_flags and
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request.META.get('HTTP_AUTHORIZATION', None) is not None):
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# This request uses standard API based authentication.
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# For override_api_url_scheme views, we skip our normal
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# rate limiting, because there are good reasons clients
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# might need to (e.g.) request a large number of uploaded
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# files or avatars in quick succession.
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target_function = authenticated_rest_api_view(skip_rate_limiting=True)(target_function)
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elif ('override_api_url_scheme' in view_flags and
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request.GET.get('api_key') is not None):
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# This request uses legacy API authentication. We
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# unfortunately need that in the React Native mobile apps,
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# because there's no way to set HTTP_AUTHORIZATION in
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# React Native. See last block for rate limiting notes.
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target_function = authenticated_uploads_api_view(skip_rate_limiting=True)(target_function)
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# /json views (web client) validate with a session token (cookie)
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elif not request.path.startswith("/api") and request.user.is_authenticated:
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# Authenticated via sessions framework, only CSRF check needed
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auth_kwargs = {}
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if 'override_api_url_scheme' in view_flags:
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auth_kwargs["skip_rate_limiting"] = True
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target_function = csrf_protect(authenticated_json_view(target_function, **auth_kwargs))
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# most clients (mobile, bots, etc) use HTTP Basic Auth and REST calls, where instead of
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# username:password, we use email:apiKey
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elif request.META.get('HTTP_AUTHORIZATION', None):
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# Wrap function with decorator to authenticate the user before
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# proceeding
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view_kwargs = {}
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if 'allow_incoming_webhooks' in view_flags:
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view_kwargs['is_webhook'] = True
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target_function = authenticated_rest_api_view(**view_kwargs)(target_function) # type: ignore # likely mypy bug
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# Pick a way to tell user they're not authed based on how the request was made
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else:
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# If this looks like a request from a top-level page in a
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# browser, send the user to the login page
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if 'text/html' in request.META.get('HTTP_ACCEPT', ''):
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# TODO: It seems like the `?next=` part is unlikely to be helpful
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return HttpResponseRedirect('%s?next=%s' % (settings.HOME_NOT_LOGGED_IN, request.path))
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# Ask for basic auth (email:apiKey)
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elif request.path.startswith("/api"):
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return json_unauthorized()
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# Logged out user accessing an endpoint with anonymous user access on JSON; proceed.
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elif request.path.startswith("/json") and 'allow_anonymous_user_web' in view_flags:
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auth_kwargs = dict(allow_unauthenticated=True)
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target_function = csrf_protect(authenticated_json_view(
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target_function, **auth_kwargs))
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# Session cookie expired, notify the client
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else:
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return json_unauthorized(www_authenticate='session')
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if request.method not in ["GET", "POST"]:
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# process_as_post needs to be the outer decorator, because
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# otherwise we might access and thus cache a value for
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# request.REQUEST.
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target_function = process_as_post(target_function)
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return target_function(request, **kwargs)
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return json_method_not_allowed(list(supported_methods.keys()))
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