For web-public streams, clients can access full topic history
without being authenticated. They only need to additionally
send "streams:web-public" narrow with their request like all
the other web-public queries.
By default, the Django Sentry integration provides the email address
and username of pulled from the auth layer. This is potentially PII,
and not data that we wish to store. Enable sending user data at all,
by setting `send_default_pii=True`, but strip the username and
email (which are the same, in Zulip) before sending. Users will be
identified in Sentry only by their IP address, user ID, realm, and
role.
The return type of `ugettext_lazy('...')` (aliased as `_`) is a
promise, which is only forced into a string when it is dealt with in
string context. This `django.utils.functional.lazy.__proxy__` object
is not entirely transparent, however -- it cannot be serialized by
`orjson`, and `isinstance(x, str) == False`, which can lead to
surprising action-at-a-distance.
In the two places which will serialize the role value (either into
Zulip's own error reporting queue, or Sentry's), force the return
value. Failure to do this results in errors being dropped
mostly-silently, as they cannot be serialized and enqueued by the
error reporter logger, which has no recourse but to just log a
warning; see previous commit.
When we do this forcing, explicitly override the language to be the
realm default. Failure to provide this override would translate the
role into the role in the language of the _request_, yielding varying
results.
596cf2580b ignored the loggers of all SuspiciousOperation subclasses,
but not SuspiciousOperation itself. Almost all locations raise one of
the more specific subclasses, with the exception of one location in
the session middleware[1].
Ignore the overall django.security.SuspiciousOperation logger as well.
[1] https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/31962
This commit adds automatic detection of extra output (other than
printed by testing library or tools) in stderr and stdout by code under
test test-backend when it is run with flag --ban-console-output.
It also prints the test that produced the extra console output.
Fixes: #1587.
Extracting a section for presence endpoints and using path() rather
than re_path() results in a much cleaner implementation of this
concept.
This eliminates the last case where test_openapi couldn't correctly
match an endpoint documentation with the OpenAPI definitions for it.
Via API, users can now access messages which are in web-public
streams without any authentication.
If the user is not authenticated, we assume it is a web-public
query and add `streams:web-public` narrow if not already present
to the narrow. web-public streams are also directly accessible.
Any malformed narrow which is not allowed in a web-public query
results in a 400 or 401. See test_message_fetch for the allowed
queries.
django.security.DisallowedHost is only one of a set of exceptions that
are "SuspiciousOperation" exceptions; all return a 400 to the user
when they bubble up[1]; all of them are uninteresting to Sentry.
While they may, in bulk, show a mis-configuration of some sort of the
application, such a failure should be detected via the increase in
400's, not via these, which are uninteresting individually.
While all of these are subclasses of SuspiciousOperation, we enumerate
them explicitly for a number of reasons:
- There is no one logger we can ignore that captures all of them.
Each of the errors uses its own logger, and django does not supply
a `django.security` logger that all of them feed into.
- Nor can we catch this by examining the exception object. The
SuspiciousOperation exception is raised too early in the stack for
us to catch the exception by way of middleware and check
`isinstance`. But at the Sentry level, in `add_context`, it is no
longer an exception but a log entry, and as such we have no
`isinstance` that can be applied; we only know the logger name.
- Finally, there is the semantic argument that while we have decided
to ignore this set of security warnings, we _may_ wish to log new
ones that may be added at some point in the future. It is better
to opt into those ignores than to blanket ignore all messages from
the security logger.
This moves the DisallowedHost `ignore_logger` to be adjacent to its
kin, and not on the middleware that may trigger it. Consistency is
more important than locality in this case.
Of these, the DisallowedHost logger if left as the only one that is
explicitly ignored in the LOGGING configuration in
`computed_settings.py`; it is by far the most frequent, and the least
likely to be malicious or impactful (unlike, say, RequestDataTooBig).
[1] https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/3.0/ref/exceptions/#suspiciousoperation
There are three exceptions in Python3 which are descended from
BaseException, but not Exception: GeneratorExit, KeyboardInterrupt,
and SystemExit. None of these are suitable to be sent to Sentry.
For example, SystemExit is raised by `sys.exit`; in that sense, it is
never "uncaught" because we chose to cause it explicitly.
Use the suggested form[1] for ignoring specific classes of exceptions.
[1] https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-python/issues/149#issuecomment-434448781
Our intent throughout the codebase is to treat email
case-insensitively.
The only codepath affected by this bug is remote_user_sso, as that's the
only one that currently passes potentially both a user_profile and
ExternalAuthDataDict when creating the ExternalAuthResult. That's why we
add a test specifically for that codepath.
This commit adds EMAIL_PORT setting for explicitly specifying the
port of SMTP provider in dev_settings.py.
We also change email_backends.send_email_smtp to pass EMAIL_PORT
along with EMAIL_HOST to smtplib.SMTP.
After this change, we will not need to include the port along with
host in EMAIL_HOST.
Also updated the email.md docs accordingly for this change.
As part of issue #15344, the error report emails add the user role
information. This commit adds the user role information to be used
by sentry as well.
The apple developer webapp consistently refers this App ID. So,
this clears any confusion that can occur.
Since python social auth only requires us to include App ID in
_AUDIENCE(a list), we do that in computed settings making it easier for
server admin and we make it much clear by having it set to
APP_ID instead of BUNDLE_ID.
Uses git release as this version 3.4.0 is not released to pypi.
This is required for removing some overriden functions of
apple auth backend class AppleAuthBackend.
With the update we also make following changes:
* Fix full name being populated as "None None".
c5c74f27dd that's included in update assigns first_name and last_name
to None when no name is provided by apple. Due to this our
code is filling return_data['full_name'] to 'None None'.
This commit fixes it by making first and last name strings empty.
* Remove decode_id_token override.
Python social auth merged the PR we sent including the changes
we made to decode_id_token function. So, now there is no
necessity for the override.
* Add _AUDIENCE setting in computed_settings.py.
`decode_id_token` is dependent on this setting.
This lets us test the recursion bug behavior of this logging handler
without resulting in `logging.error` output being printed to the
console in the event that the test passes.
Use the default configuration, which catches Error logging and
exceptions. This is placed in `computed_settings.py` to match the
suggested configuration from Sentry[1], which places it in `settings.py`
to ensure it is consistently loaded early enough.
It is placed behind a check for SENTRY_DSN soas to not incur the
additional overhead of importing the `sentry_sdk` modules if Sentry is
not configured.
[1] https://docs.sentry.io/platforms/python/django/
Fixes#15904.
settings is supposed to be a proper OneLogin_Saml2_Settings object,
rather than an empty dictionary. This bug wasn't easy to spot because
the codepath that causes this to demonstrate runs only if the
SAMLResponse contains encrypted assertions.
In particular importing gitter data leads to having accounts with these
noreply github emails. We generally only want users to have emails that
we can actually send messages to, so we'll keep the old behavior of
disallowing sign up with such an email address. However, if an account
of this type already exists, we should allow the user to have access to
it.
A few major themes here:
- We remove short_name from UserProfile
and add the appropriate migration.
- We remove short_name from various
cache-related lists of fields.
- We allow import tools to continue to
write short_name to their export files,
and then we simply ignore the field
at import time.
- We change functions like do_create_user,
create_user_profile, etc.
- We keep short_name in the /json/bots
API. (It actually gets turned into
an email.)
- We don't modify our LDAP code much
here.