While there are legitimate use cases for embedded Zulip in an iFrame,
they're rare, and it's more important to prevent this category of
attack by default.
Sysadmins can switch this to a whitelist when they want to use frames.
We no longer need or use these, since Zulip installs a pinned version
of node directly with the scripts/setup/install-node tool.
Noticed because in the effort of adding Ubuntu bionic support, we
noticed the package names changed again.
Apparently, our nginx configuration's use of "localhost", combined
with the default in modern Linux of having localhost resolve to both
the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on a given machine, resulted in `nginx`
load-balancing requests to a given Zulip server between the IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses. This, in turn, resulted in irrelevant 502 errors
problems every few minutes on the /events endpoints for some clients.
Disabling IPv6 on the server resolved the problem, as does simply
spelling localhost as 127.0.0.1 for the `nginx` upstreams that we
declare for proxying to non-Django services on localhost.
Now, one can just set `no_serve_uploads` in `zulip.conf` to prevent
`nginx` from serving locally uploaded files.
This should help simplify the S3 integration setup process.
This option is intended to support situations like a quick Docker
setup where doing HTTPS adds more setup overhead than it's worth.
It's not intended to be used in actual production environments.
This is preferred, since we don't currently have a way to run Django
logic on the postgres hosts with the Docker implementation.
This is a necessary part of removing the need for the docker-zulip
package to patch this file to make Zulip work with Docker.
The main purpose of this change is to make it guaranteed that
`manage.py register_server --rotate-key` can edit the
/etc/zulip/zulip-secrets.conf configuration via crudini.
But it also adds value by ensuring zulip-secrets.conf is not readable
by other users.
With modern apt-key, the fingerprints are displayed in the more fully
written-out format with spaces, and so `apt-key add` was being run
every time.
This fixes some unnecessary work being done on each puppet run on
Debian stretch.
I would have preferred to not need to do this by upgrading to
upstream, but see #7423 for notes on why that isn't going to work
(basically they broke support for puppet older than 4).
Apparently, these confused the puppet template parser, since they are
somewhat similar to its syntax, resulting in errors trying to use
these templates. It's easy enough to just remove the example
content from the base postgres config file.
We can't really do this in the zulip manifests (since it's sorta a
sysadmin policy decision), but these scripts can cause significant
load when Nagios logs into a server (because many of them take 50ms or
more of work to run). So we just get rid of them.
It seems unlikely we're going to add support for additional older
Debian-based distributions, so it makes sense to just use an else
statement. This should save a bit of busywork every time we add a new
distro.
Mostly, this involves adding the big block at the bottom and making
10 a variable so that it's easier to compare different versions of
these.
I did an audit of the configuration changes between 9.6 and 10, so
this should be fine, but it hasn't been tested yet.
Our recent addition of Content-Security-Policy to the file uploads
backend broke in-browser previews of PDFs.
The content-types change in the last commit fixed loading PDFs for
most users; but the result was ugly, because e.g. Chrome would put the
PDF previewer into a frame (so there were 2 left scrollbars).
There were two changes needed to fix this:
* Loading the style to use the plugin. We corrected this by adding
`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';`
* Loading the plugin. Our CSP blocked loading the PDf viewer plugin.
To correct this, we add object-src 'self', and then limit the
plugin-type to just the one for application/pdf.
We verified this new CSP using https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
in addition to manual testing.
Previously, user-uploaded PDF files were not properly rendered by
browsers with the local uploads backend, because we weren't setting
the correct content-type.
This adds a basic Content-Security-Policy for user-uploaded avatars
served by the LOCAL_UPLOADS backend.
I think this is for now an unnecessary follow-up to
d608a9d315, but is worth doing because
we may later change what can be uploaded in the avatars directory.
This adds a basic Content-Security-Policy for user-uploaded files with local uploads.
While over time, we plan to add CSP for the main site as well, this CSP is particularly
important for the local-uploads backend, which often shares a domain with the main site.
Tim Abbott
Sampriti Panda
Vishnu Ks
Jason Michalski
Aditya Bansal