Refactor `report_csp_violations` view to use `typed_endpoint` decorator
instead of `has_request_variables`. This change improves code
consistency and enhances codebase comprehension.
Depending on the kind of config error being shown, different "go back"
links may be more appropriate.
We probably hard-coded /login/ for it, because these config errors are
most commonly used for authentication backend config error, where it
makes sense to have /login/ as "go back", because the user most likely
indeed got there from the login page.
However, for remote_billing_bouncer_not_configured, it doesn't make
sense, because the user almost surely is already logged in and got there
by clicking "Plan management" inside the gear menu in the logged in app.
It's best for these to just be consistent. Therefore:
1. The .../not-configured/ error page endpoint should be restricted to
.has_billing_access users only.
2. For consistency, self_hosting_auth_view_common is tweaked to also do
the .has_billing_access check as the first thing, to avoid revealing
configuration information via its redirect/error-handling behavior.
The revealed configuration information seems super harmless, but it's
simpler to not have to worry about it and just be consistent.
Just shows a config error page if the bouncer is not enabled. Uses a new
endpoint for this so that it can work nicely for both browser and
desktop app clients.
It's necessary, because the desktop app expects to get a json response
with either an error or billing_access_url to redirect to. Showing a
nice config error page can't be done via the json error mechanism, so
instead we just serve a redirect to the new error page, which the app
will open in the browser in a new window or tab.
Only affects zulipchat, by being based on the BILLING_ENABLED setting.
The restricted backends in this commit are
- AzureAD - restricted to Standard plan
- SAML - restricted to Plus plan, although it was already practically
restricted due to requiring server-side configuration to be done by us
This restriction is placed upon **enabling** a backend - so
organizations that already have a backend enabled, will continue to be
able to use it. This allows us to make exceptions and enable a backend
for an org manually via the shell, and to grandfather organizations into
keeping the backend they have been relying on.
This commit adds a realm-level setting named
'zulip_update_announcements_stream' that configures the
stream to which zulip updates should be posted.
Fixes part of #28604.
This commit renames the realm-level setting
'signup_notifications_stream' to 'signup_announcements_stream'.
The new name reflects better what the setting does.
This commit renames the realm-level setting 'notifications_stream'
to 'new_stream_announcements_stream'.
The new name reflects better what the setting does.
This applies access restrictions in SQL, so that individual messages
do not need to be walked one-by-one. It only functions for stream
messages.
Use of this method significantly speeds up checks if we moved "all
visible messages" in a topic, since we no longer need to walk every
remaining message in the old topic to determine that at least one was
visible to the user. Similarly, it significantly speeds up merging
into existing topics, since it no longer must walk every message in
the new topic to determine if the user could see at least one.
Finally, it unlocks the ability to bulk-update only messages the user
has access to, in a single query (see subsequent commit).
The endpoint was lacking validation that the authentication_methods dict
submitted by the user made sense. So e.g. it allowed submitting a
nonsense key like NoSuchBackend or modifying the realm's configured
authentication methods for a backend that's not enabled on the server,
which should not be allowed.
Both were ultimately harmless, because:
1. Submitting NoSuchBackend would luckily just trigger a KeyError inside
the transaction.atomic() block in do_set_realm_authentication_methods
so it would actually roll back the database changes it was trying to
make. So this couldn't actually create some weird
RealmAuthenticationMethod entries.
2. Silently enabling or disabling e.g. GitHub for a realm when GitHub
isn't enabled on the server doesn't really change anything. And this
action is only available to the realm's admins to begin with, so
there's no attack vector here.
test_supported_backends_only_updated wasn't actually testing anything,
because the state it was asserting:
```
self.assertFalse(github_auth_enabled(realm))
self.assertTrue(dev_auth_enabled(realm))
self.assertFalse(password_auth_enabled(realm))
```
matched the desired state submitted to the API...
```
result = self.client_patch(
"/json/realm",
{
"authentication_methods": orjson.dumps(
{"Email": False, "Dev": True, "GitHub": False}
).decode()
},
)
```
so we just replace it with a new test that tests the param validation.
This commit updates the API to check the permission to subscribe other
users while creating multi-use invites. The API will raise error if
the user passes the "stream_ids" parameter (even when it contains only
default streams) and the calling user does not have permission to
subscribe others to streams.
We did not add this before as we only allowed admins to create
multiuse invites, but now we have added a setting which can be used
to allow users with other roles as well to create multiuse invites.
Earlier, after a successful POST request on find accounts page
users were redirected to a URL with the emails (submitted via form)
as URL parameters. Those raw emails in the URL were used to
display on a template.
We no longer redirect to such a URL; instead, we directly render
a template with emails passed as a context variable.
Fixes part of #3128
When you click "Plan management", the desktop app opens
/self-hosted-billing/ in your browser immediately. So that works badly
if you're already logged into another account in the browser, since that
session will be used and it may be for a different user account than in
the desktop app, causing unintended behavior.
The solution is to replace the on click behavior for "Plan management"
in the desktop app case, to instead make a request to a new endpoint
/json/self-hosted-billing, which provides the billing access url in a
json response. The desktop app takes that URL and window.open()s it (in
the browser). And so a remote billing session for the intended user will
be obtained.
This is preparatory work towards adding a Topic model.
We plan to use the local variable name as 'topic' for
the Topic model objects.
Currently, we use *topic as the local variable name for
topic names.
We rename local variables of the form *topic to *topic_name
so that we don't need to think about type collisions in
individual code paths where we might want to talk about both
Topic objects and strings for the topic name.
This is preparatory work towards adding a Topic model.
We plan to use the local variable name as 'topic' for
the Topic model objects.
Currently, we use *topic as the local variable name for
topic names.
We rename local variables of the form *topic to *topic_name
so that we don't need to think about type collisions in
individual code paths where we might want to talk about both
Topic objects and strings for the topic name.
Earlier, 'topic' parameter length for
'/users/me/subscriptions/muted_topics' and '/user_topics' endpoints
were not validated before DB operations which resulted in exception:
'DataError: value too long for type character varying(60)'.
This commit adds validation for the topic name length to be
capped at 'max_topic_length' characters.
The doc is updated to suggest clients that the topic name should
have a maximum length of 'max_topic_length'.
Fixes#27796.
Previously, passing a url longer than 200 characters for
jitsi_server_url caused a low-level failure at DB level. This
commit adds this restriction at API level.
Fixes part of #27355.
While the query parameter is properly excaped when inlined into the
template (and thus is not an XSS), it can still produce content which
misleads the user via carefully-crafted query parameter.
Validate that the parameter looks like an email address.
Thanks to jinjo2 for reporting this, via HackerOne.
Alex Vandiver
Vector73
Mahhheshh
Aman Agrawal
Mateusz Mandera
Anders Kaseorg
Prakhar Pratyush
Sahil Batra
swayam0322