We previously used to to redirect to config error page with
a different URL. This commit renders config error in the same
URL where configuration error is encountered. This way when
conifguration error is fixed the user can refresh to continue
normally or go back to login page from the link provided to
choose any other backend auth.
Also moved those URLs to dev_urls.py so that they can be easily
accessed to work on styling etc.
In tests, removed some of the asserts checking status code to be 200
as the function `assert_in_success_response` does that check.
Having both of these is confusing; TORNADO_SERVER is used only when
there is one TORNADO_PORT. Its primary use is actually to be _unset_,
and signal that in-process handling is to be done.
Rename to USING_TORNADO, to parallel the existing USING_RABBITMQ, and
switch the places that used it for its contents to using
TORNADO_PORTS.
We can compute the intended number of processes from the sharding
configuration. In doing so, also validate that all of the ports are
contiguous.
This removes a discrepancy between `scripts/lib/sharding.py` and other
parts of the codebase about if merely having a `[tornado_sharding]`
section is sufficient to enable sharding. Having behaviour which
changes merely based on if an empty section exists is surprising.
This does require that a (presumably empty) `9800` configuration line
exist, but making that default explicit is useful.
After this commit, configuring sharding can be done by adding to
`zulip.conf`:
```
[tornado_sharding]
9800 = # default
9801 = other_realm
```
Followed by running `./scripts/refresh-sharding-and-restart`.
In development and test, we keep the Tornado port at 9993 and 9983,
respectively; this allows tests to run while a dev instance is
running.
In production, moving to port 9800 consistently removes an odd edge
case, when just one worker is on an entirely different port than if
two workers are used.
This was called in both if and else with the same argument.
I believe there's no reason for it to exist twice and having
it just once would be a bit cleaner.
Calling `render()` in a middleware before LocaleMiddleware has run
will pick up the most-recently-set locale. This may be from the
_previous_ request, since the current language is thread-local. This
results in the "Organization does not exist" page occasionally being
in not-English, depending on the preferences of the request which that
thread just finished serving.
Move HostDomainMiddleware below LocaleMiddleware; none of the earlier
middlewares call `render()`, so are safe. This will also allow the
"Organization does not exist" page to be localized based on the user's
browser preferences.
Unfortunately, it also means that the default LocaleMiddleware catches
the 404 from the HostDomainMiddlware and helpfully tries to check if
the failure is because the URL lacks a language component (e.g.
`/en/`) by turning it into a 304 to that new URL. We must subclass
the default LocaleMiddleware to remove this unwanted functionality.
Doing so exposes a two places in tests that relied (directly or
indirectly) upon the redirection: '/confirmation_key'
was redirected to '/en/confirmation_key', since the non-i18n version
did not exist; and requests to `/stats/realm/not_existing_realm/`
incorrectly were expecting a 302, not a 404.
This regression likely came in during f00ff1ef62, since prior to
that, the HostDomainMiddleware ran _after_ the rest of the request had
completed.
Its functionality was added to Django upstream in 2.1. Also remove
the SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE = 'Lax' setting since it’s the default.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulip.com>
This undoes a small part of b8a2e6b5f8; namely, logs to
`zulip.zerver.webhooks`, which are all exceptions from webhooks except
UnsupportedWebhookEventType, should still be logged to the main error
loggers. This maintains the property that exceptions generating 500's
are all present in `errors.log`.
Django treats path("<name>") like re_path(r"(?P<name>[^/]+)") and
path("<path:name>") like re_path(r"(?P<name>.+)").
This is more readable and consistent than the mix of slightly
different regexes we had before, and fixes various bugs:
• The r'apps/(.*)$' regex was missing a start anchor ^, so it
incorrectly matched all URLs that included apps/ as a substring
anywhere.
• The r'accounts/login/(google)/$' regex was missing a start anchor ^,
so it incorrectly matched all URLs that ended with
accounts/login/google/.
• The type annotation of zerver.views.realm_export.delete_realm_export
takes export_id as an int, but it was previously passed as a string.
• The type annotation of zerver.views.users.avatar takes medium as a
bool, but it was previously passed as a string.
• The [0-9A-Za-z]+ pattern for uidb64 was missing the - and _
characters that can validly be part of a base64url encoded
string (although I think the id is actually a decimal integer here,
in which case only 012345ADEIMNOQTUYcgjkwxyz are present in its
base64url encoding).
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulip.com>
Replace default root logger with zulip.auth.apple for apple auth
in file zproject/backends.py and update the test cases
accordingly in file zerver/tests/test_auth_backends.py
This clears it out of the data sent to Sentry, where it is duplicative
with the indexed metadata -- and potentially exposes PHI if Sentry's
"make this issue public" feature is used.
`zulip.zerver.lib.webhooks.common` was very opaque previously,
especially since none of the logging was actually done from that
module.
Adjust to a more explicit logger name.
Any exception is an "unexpected event", which means talking about
having an "unexpected event logger" or "unexpected event exception" is
confusing. As the error message in `exceptions.py` already explains,
this is about an _unsupported_ event type.
This also switches the path that these exceptions are written to,
accordingly.
For web-public streams, clients can access full topic history
without being authenticated. They only need to additionally
send "streams:web-public" narrow with their request like all
the other web-public queries.
By default, the Django Sentry integration provides the email address
and username of pulled from the auth layer. This is potentially PII,
and not data that we wish to store. Enable sending user data at all,
by setting `send_default_pii=True`, but strip the username and
email (which are the same, in Zulip) before sending. Users will be
identified in Sentry only by their IP address, user ID, realm, and
role.
The return type of `ugettext_lazy('...')` (aliased as `_`) is a
promise, which is only forced into a string when it is dealt with in
string context. This `django.utils.functional.lazy.__proxy__` object
is not entirely transparent, however -- it cannot be serialized by
`orjson`, and `isinstance(x, str) == False`, which can lead to
surprising action-at-a-distance.
In the two places which will serialize the role value (either into
Zulip's own error reporting queue, or Sentry's), force the return
value. Failure to do this results in errors being dropped
mostly-silently, as they cannot be serialized and enqueued by the
error reporter logger, which has no recourse but to just log a
warning; see previous commit.
When we do this forcing, explicitly override the language to be the
realm default. Failure to provide this override would translate the
role into the role in the language of the _request_, yielding varying
results.
596cf2580b ignored the loggers of all SuspiciousOperation subclasses,
but not SuspiciousOperation itself. Almost all locations raise one of
the more specific subclasses, with the exception of one location in
the session middleware[1].
Ignore the overall django.security.SuspiciousOperation logger as well.
[1] https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/31962
This commit adds automatic detection of extra output (other than
printed by testing library or tools) in stderr and stdout by code under
test test-backend when it is run with flag --ban-console-output.
It also prints the test that produced the extra console output.
Fixes: #1587.
Extracting a section for presence endpoints and using path() rather
than re_path() results in a much cleaner implementation of this
concept.
This eliminates the last case where test_openapi couldn't correctly
match an endpoint documentation with the OpenAPI definitions for it.
Via API, users can now access messages which are in web-public
streams without any authentication.
If the user is not authenticated, we assume it is a web-public
query and add `streams:web-public` narrow if not already present
to the narrow. web-public streams are also directly accessible.
Any malformed narrow which is not allowed in a web-public query
results in a 400 or 401. See test_message_fetch for the allowed
queries.
django.security.DisallowedHost is only one of a set of exceptions that
are "SuspiciousOperation" exceptions; all return a 400 to the user
when they bubble up[1]; all of them are uninteresting to Sentry.
While they may, in bulk, show a mis-configuration of some sort of the
application, such a failure should be detected via the increase in
400's, not via these, which are uninteresting individually.
While all of these are subclasses of SuspiciousOperation, we enumerate
them explicitly for a number of reasons:
- There is no one logger we can ignore that captures all of them.
Each of the errors uses its own logger, and django does not supply
a `django.security` logger that all of them feed into.
- Nor can we catch this by examining the exception object. The
SuspiciousOperation exception is raised too early in the stack for
us to catch the exception by way of middleware and check
`isinstance`. But at the Sentry level, in `add_context`, it is no
longer an exception but a log entry, and as such we have no
`isinstance` that can be applied; we only know the logger name.
- Finally, there is the semantic argument that while we have decided
to ignore this set of security warnings, we _may_ wish to log new
ones that may be added at some point in the future. It is better
to opt into those ignores than to blanket ignore all messages from
the security logger.
This moves the DisallowedHost `ignore_logger` to be adjacent to its
kin, and not on the middleware that may trigger it. Consistency is
more important than locality in this case.
Of these, the DisallowedHost logger if left as the only one that is
explicitly ignored in the LOGGING configuration in
`computed_settings.py`; it is by far the most frequent, and the least
likely to be malicious or impactful (unlike, say, RequestDataTooBig).
[1] https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/3.0/ref/exceptions/#suspiciousoperation
Vishnu KS
Anders Kaseorg
Dinesh
Mateusz Mandera
Alex Vandiver
palash
Aman Agrawal
Tim Abbott
Mohit Gupta
savish