This reverses the policy that was set, but incompletely enforced, by
commit 951514dd7d. The self-closing tag
syntax is clearer, more consistent, simpler to parse, compatible with
XML, preferred by Prettier, and (most importantly now) required by
FormatJS.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulip.com>
We don't want to import tippyjs module here
along with its dependencies, so we just copied
over tippyjs defaults here. They should be
work fine for /stats page even if we decide to change
defaults for the app in tippyjs and forget to do
it here.
Discount is applied relative to the price per license of our normal
plans. For fixed price plans, the concept of discount doesn't make
any sense since we manually assign a price for the entire realm
irrespective of the number of users in the realm.
We fixed the main issue of this form in CVE-2020-9444, but the audit
done at that time only included links found in rendered_markdown; this
change completes our audit for links with target=_blank anywhere in
the codebase.
We now prevent these variations:
* <hr/>
* <hr />
* <br/>
* <br />
We could enforce similar consistency for other void
tags, if we wished, but these two are particularly
prevalent.
We currently have code to calculate the value of realm_icon_url,
admin_emails and default_discount in two diffrent places. With
the addition of showing confirmation links it would become three.
The easiest way to deduplicate the code and make the view cleaner
is by doing the calculations in template. Alternatively one can
write a function that takes users, realms and confirmations as
arguments and sets the value of realm_icon_url, admin_emails and
default_discount appropriately in realm object according to the
type of the confirmation. But that seems more messy than passing
the functions directly to template approach.
Bootstrap v2.2.0^2~40^2~6 changes this default to false, so this is a
prerequisite to upgrading Bootstrap, and it’s also safer.
This closes an HTML injection path via user full names in the emoji
reaction tooltip. It doesn’t appear to be exploitable for cross-site
scripting because we disallow `>` in full names, and the code happens
to be written such that the next `>` is in a different parser
invocation.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulipchat.com>
This sidesteps tricky escaping issues, and will make it easier to
build a strict Content-Security-Policy.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulipchat.com>
Vishnu KS
Anders Kaseorg
Tim Abbott
Aman Agrawal
Siddharth Asthana
arpit551
Steve Howell
Anders Kaseorg
Rishi Gupta
Tim Abbott