Hash the salt, user-id, and now avatar version into the filename.
This allows the URL contents to be immutable, and thus to be marked as
immutable and cacheable. Since avatars are served unauthenticated,
hashing with a server-side salt makes the current and past avatars not
enumerable.
This requires plumbing the current (or future) avatar version through
various parts of the upload process.
Since this already requires a full migration of current avatars, also
take the opportunity to fix the missing `.png` on S3 uploads (#12852).
We switch from SHA-1 to SHA-256, but truncate it such that avatar URL
data does not substantially increase in size.
Fixes: #12852.
This commit adds three `.pysa` model files: `false_positives.pysa`
for ruling out false positive flows with `Sanitize` annotations,
`req_lib.pysa` for educating pysa about Zulip's `REQ()` pattern for
extracting user input, and `redirects.pysa` for capturing the risk
of open redirects within Zulip code. Additionally, this commit
introduces `mark_sanitized`, an identity function which can be used
to selectively clear taint in cases where `Sanitize` models will not
work. This commit also puts `mark_sanitized` to work removing known
false postive flows.
Alex Vandiver
Anders Kaseorg
Graham Bleaney