This adds a new endpoint /jwt/fetch_api_key that accepts a JWT and can
be used to fetch API keys for a certain user. The target realm is
inferred from the request and the user email is part of the JWT.
A JSON containing an user API key, delivery email and (optionally)
raw user profile data is returned in response.
The profile data in the response is optional and can be retrieved by
setting the POST param "include_profile" to "true" (default=false).
Co-authored-by: Mateusz Mandera <mateusz.mandera@zulip.com>
Updates the current 6.0 release notes to include information about
the rename to "Recent conversations", and updates past references
to "recent topics" to be consistently formatted as "Recent topics".
This commit brings AzureAD config in line with other backends:
- SOCIAL_AUTH_AZUREAD_OAUTH2_SECRET gets fetched in computed_settings.py
instead of default_settings, consistent with github/gitlab/etc.
- SOCIAL_AUTH_AZUREAD_OAUTH2_KEY gets fetched in default_settings via
get_secret(..., development_only=True) like other social backends, to
allow easier set up in dev environment, in the dev-secrets.conf file.
- The secret gets renamed from azure_oauth2_secret to
social_auth_azuread_oauth2_secret to have a consistent naming scheme with
other social backends and with the SOCIAL_AUTH_AZUREAD_OAUTH2_KEY
name. This is backwards-incompatible.
The instructions for setting it up are updated to fit how this is
currently done in AzureAD.
We'll be merging a lot more features for the 6.0 release, but this
should cover everything merged since 5.0 and not backported to 5.x
and thus already released.
This uses the myst_heading_anchors option to automatically generate
header anchors and make Sphinx aware of them. See
https://myst-parser.readthedocs.io/en/latest/syntax/optional.html#auto-generated-header-anchors.
Note: to be compatible with GitHub, MyST-Parser uses a slightly
different convention for .md fragment links than .html fragment links
when punctuation is involved. This does not affect the generated
fragment links in the HTML output.
Fixes#13264.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulip.com>
We previously had a convention of redundantly including the directory
in relative links to reduce mistakes when moving content from one file
to another. However, these days we have a broken link checker in
test-documentation, and after #21237, MyST-Parser will check relative
links (including fragments) when you run build-docs.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulip.com>
This was only used for upgrading from Zulip < 1.9.0, which is no
longer possible because Zulip < 2.1.0 had no common supported
platforms with current main.
If we ever want this optimization for a future migration, it would be
better implemented using Django merge migrations.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <anders@zulip.com>
The RabbitMQ docs state ([1]):
RabbitMQ nodes and CLI tools (e.g. rabbitmqctl) use a cookie to
determine whether they are allowed to communicate with each
other. [...] The cookie is just a string of alphanumeric
characters up to 255 characters in size. It is usually stored in a
local file.
...and goes on to state (emphasis ours):
If the file does not exist, Erlang VM will try to create one with
a randomly generated value when the RabbitMQ server starts
up. Using such generated cookie files are **appropriate in
development environments only.**
The auto-generated cookie does not use cryptographic sources of
randomness, and generates 20 characters of `[A-Z]`. Because of a
semi-predictable seed, the entropy of this password is thus less than
the idealized 26^20 = 94 bits of entropy; in actuality, it is 36 bits
of entropy, or potentially as low as 20 if the performance of the
server is known.
These sizes are well within the scope of remote brute-force attacks.
On provision, install, and upgrade, replace the default insecure
20-character Erlang cookie with a cryptographically secure
255-character string (the max length allowed).
[1] https://www.rabbitmq.com/clustering.html#erlang-cookie
Zulip writes a `rabbitmq.config` configuration file which locks down
RabbitMQ to listen only on localhost:5672, as well as the RabbitMQ
distribution port, on localhost:25672.
The "distribution port" is part of Erlang's clustering configuration;
while it is documented that the protocol is fundamentally
insecure ([1], [2]) and can result in remote arbitrary execution of
code, by default the RabbitMQ configuration on Debian and Ubuntu
leaves it publicly accessible, with weak credentials.
The configuration file that Zulip writes, while effective, is only
written _after_ the package has been installed and the service
started, which leaves the port exposed until RabbitMQ or system
restart.
Ensure that rabbitmq's `/etc/rabbitmq/rabbitmq.config` is written
before rabbitmq is installed or starts, and that changes to that file
trigger a restart of the service, such that the ports are only ever
bound to localhost. This does not mitigate existing installs, since
it does not force a rabbitmq restart.
[1] https://www.erlang.org/doc/apps/erts/erl_dist_protocol.html
[2] https://www.erlang.org/doc/reference_manual/distributed.html#distributed-erlang-system
Anders Kaseorg
Alessandro Toppi
David Rosa
Alex Vandiver
Tim Abbott
Lauryn Menard
Alya Abbott
Mateusz Mandera
Matt Keller